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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction to entertain this 
appeal pursuant to UCA $78-2-2(3)(j). This cause may be 
transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to UCA 
§78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The first issue presented for review is whether 
the trial Court errored in vacating the Sheriff's sale 
when relief of that nature was not framed by the pleadings 
nor sought by summary judgment. The standard of review 
for this issue is the following: 
If the relief granted was not requested in 
the pleadings, is the party in whose favor 
it is rendered nevertheless entitled to that 
relief. URCP 54(c)(1). Did the failure to 
request the relief in question prejudice the 
opposing party in the preparation or trial 
of the case. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 
1244 (Utah 1987). However, the issue omitted 
in the pleadings must in fact be raised and 
the parties must be provided a full 
opportunity to meet it. Owen v. Owen, 734 
P.2d 414 (Utah 1986). In order to grant 
relief outside the pleadings, facts developed 
by the evidence must warrant the relief 
granted and that relief must be a permissible 
form of relief for the claims litigated. 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1987). Most, Tf not all cases granting 
relief under Rule 54(c)(1), URCP, have done 
so in the context of relief being granted 
after trial where evidence has been received 
which bears upon the issues not framed by 
the pleadings. Combe v. Warrenfs Family 
Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984). 
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The second issue presented for review is whether 
issues of material fact precluded the granting of summary 
judgment which vacated the Sheriff's sale. The applicable 
standard of review for this issue is the following: 
An appeal from a motion for summary judgment 
first determines the existence of a genuine 
issue of any material fact. Rule 56(c), 
URCP. Provo City Corp. v. State of Utah, 
795 PTId TT20 (Utah 1990). Facts and 
inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in 
that light most favorable to the losing 
party. Provo City Corp., supra. In the 
absence of a genuine issue of a material 
fact, it must then be determined whether the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Arrow Indus, v. Zion's First 
Natfl Bank, 767 PTId 9l5 (Utah 1988). In 
the absence of a material fact, the 
appellate court is free to reappraise the 
legal conclusions of the trial court. 
Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578 (Utah 
App. 1990) ; Shire "Development v. Frontier 
Investments, 799 P.2d 221, (Utah App. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
This appeal does not present any constitutional 
provision, statute, ordinance, rule or regulation whose 
interpretation is determinative of the issues of the case. 
However, the scope and application of Rule 54(c)(1), URCP, 
as developed by applicable case authorities cited herein, 
is central to a resolution of the first issue presented 
herein for review. The pertinent portion of that rule 
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reads as follows: 
... every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it 
is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The gist of this case is whether an execution 
Sheriff's sale against real property should be vacated and 
set aside, or whether the judgment creditor, who bid at 
his own sale, but failed to pay that bid, should be 
compelled by order to do so, and failing to do so, whether 
judgment for his bid should be entered against him. 
Thomas Farr, the Plaintiff and Appellee (hereinafter 
referred to as Farr), sought to recover on a foreign 
judgment from Defendants and Appellants, Earl B. 
Brinkerhoff and Eunice Brinkerhoff (hereinafter referred 
to as Brinkerhoffs), and executed against certain real 
property situate in Wayne County, Utah. Farr arranged the 
sale, attended by his counsel, bid his desired amount, but 
failed to pay his bid. Brinkerhoffs demanded payment of 
the bid but it was not forthcoming. Farr then commenced 
suit in the District Court seeking to avoid the need to 
pay his bid, and Brinkerhoffs counterclaimed to enforce 
the sale and have the bid paid. The proper time to pay a 
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valid homestead was questioned in the lower Court, but is 
not presented for review on appeal. The interest of Mrs. 
Brinkerhoff in the subject property was raised, but 
resolved by the trial Court, and neither party has 
appealed that ruling. The case did not go to trial. Each 
party moved for summary judgment. Both motions were 
initially denied. In denying summary judgment for each 
party, the Court found issues of fact, but ordered the 
parties to appear and show cause why the Sheriff's sale 
should not be vacated. One year later the parties appeared 
before the Court, and again argued their respective 
positions. The Court then ruled that the Sheriff's sale 
should be set aside. Brinkerhoffs appeal the order of the 
trial Court contending that Farr never requested in his 
pleadings or motions that the Sheriff's sale be vacated, 
and in any event, that issues of fact precluded the 
granting of summary judgment as to that matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1980 Brinkerhoffs purchased the real property 
at issue in this cause. They took title as joint tenants 
by warranty deed (R.63). The Brinkerhoffs used jointly 
owned funds to purchase the property, coupled with loan 
proceeds jointly incurred (R.60, 63, 64). 
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Farr recovered judgment against Mr. Brinkerhoff 
in Alaska on September 20, 1985 for $65,520.20 (R13, 14, 
66, 155). 
By Articles of Incorporation filed December 11, 
1985, Brinkerhoffs created EBB, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
and conveyed the real property to that corporation by deed 
dated December 23, 1985 (R.65, 155). The consideration 
flowing to Brinkerhoffs for the conveyance of the land to 
EBB, Inc., was complete, joint, and equal ownership of the 
corporation, although actual stock certificates were not 
issued (R.60, 65, 66) . 
After domesticating his judgment in Utah, Farr 
filed suit against the Brinkerhoffs and EBB, Inc., seeking 
to avoid as a fraudulent conveyance the December 23, 1985 
deed to the corporation (R.10, 11, 12, 155, 156). Mr. 
Brinkerhoff personally met with Paul D. Lyman, counsel for 
Farr, on November 23, 1988 to discuss that action (R.156). 
This meeting resulted in an agreement for the suit to be 
dismissed in return for a deed conveying the real property 
from EBB, Inc., to Mr. Brinkerhoff individually (R.156). 
Mr. Lyman drafted the deed, and Mr. Brinkerhoff signed it 
as corporate agent for EBB, Inc., although the acknowledge-
ment does not identify his authority to do so (R.17, 66, 
156). Farrfs counsel claims he advised Mr. Brinkerhoff 
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during this meeting that the deed would completely divest 
Mrs. Brinkerhoff of her interest in the property (R.156) 
but he offers no justification for that result, and of 
greater moment, he does not assert that Mr. Brinkerhoff 
represented himself as having authority or power to 
alienate the property interest of either his wife or the 
corporation. Mr. Brinkerhoff denies that he intended to 
divest his wife or the corporation of their interests in 
the property, denies that he had the right or power to do 
so, and suggests that Farr's counsel took advantage of him 
(R.66, 67). 
Neither Farr nor his counsel had contact 
regarding these matters with Mrs. Brinkerhoff, and she is 
explicit in stating that she Mdid not agree to, approve 
of, or acquiesce inM a deed which divested the corporation 
of its title to the land, and never nwaived any claim she 
had in" the land or the corporation (R.60). 
The land had a fair market value in 1980, before 
improvements, of $257,413.00 (R.65). In 1986, after 
improvements, it appraised for $350,500.00 (R.65). At the 
time of the Sheriff's sale, the property was encumbered by 
a mortgage to First Security Bank in the amount of 
$110,000.00 (R.67). 
Farr executed against the property and completed 
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his sale on March 6, 1989 (R.67, 157). Although Farr did 
not personally attend the sale, he was represented by his 
counsel who bid on his behalf (R.3, T.12). Farr was the 
only bidder. His bid amount was $121,416.05, but he did 
not pay the bid (R.67). 
Prior to the sale, Mr. Brinkerhoff recorded a 
homestead claim for $10,000.00, and a correction deed to 
the property which vested title in him and his wife jointly 
(R.67). Before making the bid, Farr?s counsel reviewed 
both the homestead declaration and the correction deed, 
and discussed those instruments by telephone with counsel 
for Brinkerhoffs (this author)(T.12). 
Farrfs Alaska judgment totalled $89,306.72 on the 
date of sale (R.68). Thus, he had a credit bid to that 
extent, leaving a cash requirement to meet of $32,109.33. 
Since he purchased the homestead of Mr. Brinkerhoff, he 
was also obligated to tender the additional sum of 
$10,000.00. As mentioned, he paid nothing. 
Following the sale, Farr's counsel prepared a 
Certificate of Sale and secured the signature thereto of 
the Deputy Wayne County Sheriff who conducted the sale 
(R.3, 26, 27), the latter having signed the Certificate on 
March 17, 1989 (R.27), eleven days after the sale. 
By letter dated April 25, 1989, counsel for 
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Brinkerhoffs requested that Farr pay his bid (R.3, 28, 29). 
Farr responded by filing suit against Brinkerhoffs in May, 
1989, seeking declaratory relief as to (a) the time when 
payment of the homestead should be made, (b) the interest, 
if any, of Mrs. Brinkerhoff in the property, and (c) 
whether redemption was available to Brinkerhoffs for an 
amount less than FarrTs bid (R.l-6). Farrfs Complaint did 
not question the validity of the Sheriff's sale. 
Brinkerhoffs answered the Complaint, contending that 
relief thereunder was improper, and counterclaimed for (a) 
an adjudication that Mrs. Brinkerhoff owned one-half of 
the land, and (b) judgment against Farr in the sum of 
$42,109.33, representing the homestead claim coupled with 
the amount of his bid which exceeded the balance due under 
his judgment (R.32-37). 
In June, 1989, Farr moved for summary judgment 
(R.40, 41). He did not file affidavits to support the 
motion, but a memorandum was filed claiming essentially 
the same relief as his Complaint (R.42-54). Neither the 
motion nor the memorandum sought to vacate or modify the 
Sheriff f s sale. 
Brinkerhoffs likewise asked for summary judgment 
(R.134-142), supporting their motion with detailed 
affidavits and other documents (R.57-133). Farr did not 
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file any affidavits to controvert the factual assertions 
of Brinkerhoffs. 
Distilling all of the pleadings, motions, 
affidavits, and other documents then on file in the suit, 
the obvious, and only, issues presented were the following: 
a. Was the homestead claim payable at the 
time of sale, or after the redemption period. This is 
clearly an issue of law. 
b. Did Mrs. Brinkerhoff have an interest in 
the property. This is an issue of fact. Since the 
affidavits of the Brinkerhoffs were uncontroverted, 
summary judgment for them should have been granted. The 
trial Court saw it otherwise by finding a factual issue. 
c. Should Farr be compelled to pay his bid, 
and if he does not, should Brinkerhoffs have judgment 
against him. 
The redemption issue raised by Farr was simply a 
misperception of the law. Talk of redemption was premature 
since Farr had never paid his bid. In any event, 
Brinkerhoffs never sought to redeem. The validity of the 
sale was never raised. Each litigant asked the Court to 
consider it lawful and grant relief accordingly. 
The trial Court entertained the competing motions. 
The homestead issue was ignored, as was the matter of 
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redemption. An issue of fact was found regarding the 
interest of Mrs. Brinkerhoff in the land. The Court then 
went beyond the issues as framed and presented by the 
parties, faulted the sale, and thus found another issue of 
fact. But then, instead of scheduling the case for trial, 
the Court directed the parties to show cause why the sale 
should not be vacated (R.145, 146), relief which no one 
wanted. The order of the Court is dated August 21, 1989 
(R.145). 
Thereafter, Farr's counsel filed an affidavit (he 
styled it nproffered testimony11) which was merely 
consistent with some of his earlier unverified claims 
(R.155-157). It added nothing new to the suit. 
Nearly a year elapsed, and on July 11, 1990, 
further argument was presented to the Court (T.l-28). The 
posture of the action had not changed. The claims and 
issues remained the same. No additional amendments, 
pleadings, or motions had been filed. However, during 
argument Farr changed his position a full turn and asked 
that the Sherifffs sale be set aside (T.5). The Court so 
ordered (R.151, 152) . 
Brinkerhoffs objected to the ruling of the Court. 
They contended that an evidentiary hearing was required 
(T.17). They again reminded the Court that Farr had not, 
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before that time, asked that the sale be vacated (T.18). 
Brinkerhoffs pointedly opposed the Sheriffs sale being 
set aside (T.19), and argued that the issue of the validity 
of the Sheriff's sale was not before the Court (T.25). 
At this hearing Farr conceded the interest of 
Mrs. Brinkerhoff in the property (T.4, 14, 20), and that 
issue found its rest (R. 151,152). Hence, we are left with 
a single inquiry: did the Court rule correctly in vacating 
the Sheriff!s sale. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SETTING ASIDE THE SHERIFF'S SALE WAS ERROR BECAUSE 
RELIEF OF THAT NATURE WAS NEITHER FRAMED BY THE 
PLEADINGS NOR PRESENTED FOR ADJUDICATION 
Farr commenced suit against Brinkerhoffs but did 
not seek to avoid the Sheriff's sale. Brinkerhoffs 
answered and counterclaimed, seeking to compel Farr to pay 
his sale bid. Farr then moved for summary judgment, 
seeking relief identical to the prayer of his Complaint. 
Brinkerhoffs also moved for summary judgment, asking that 
the Sheriff's sale be confirmed, in essence, and that Farr 
be compelled to pay his bid, or in the alternative, for 
judgment against Farr. The Court heard both motions for 
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summary judgment, denied bo-th, finding issues of fact, but 
then ordered the parties to show cause why the Sheriff's 
sale should not be set aside. Following that Court order, 
none of the parties filed additional pleadings, motions, 
or other documents, so as to change or modify the relief 
which each had initially sought. Nevertheless, additional 
argument ensued, and during that argument Farr changed his 
position and asked that the sale be set aside. No proof 
or other evidence was offered to support that position. 
However, the Court set aside the Sheriff's sale, and thus 
granted relief which had not been framed by pleadings or 
motions, and without receiving any proof or evidence to 
justify an annulment of the Sheriff's sale. It was error 
for the Court to reach and rule upon an issue which was 
neither framed by the suit, nor developed by proof and 
evidence. 
POINT II 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDED THE GRANTING 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE SHERIFF'S SALE 
When the competing motions for summary judgment 
were intially argued to the Court, an issue of fact was 
found to exist with reference to the interest of Mrs. 
Brinkerhoff in the subject property. The Court also found 
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the existence of a genuine material issue of fact by 
questioning whether the Sherifffs sale had been fully 
consummated. At that point in time, the case should have 
been scheduled for trial. The issues before the Court had 
not been modified or changed. The same issues of fact 
previously found by the Court remained in existence. 
However, during this final hearing, the issue of Mrs. 
Brinkerhoff!s interest in the real property was resolved 
when Farr conceded that point. The remaining issue related 
to the Sheriff's sale. At final oral argument, Farr 
contended that he was confused at the time of the sale, 
and his confusion caused him to bid by mistake. That 
claim had never been framed by Farr in his pleadings or 
motions, and proof and evidence of confusion and mistake 
were never offered by him. Nevertheless, the Court 
necessarily adjudicated as an issue of fact that the 
failure by Farr to pay his bid resulted from confusion and 
mistake on his part, justifying a vacation of the sale. 
Summary judgment was improper on that point because the 
matters of confusion or mistake, or both, presented factual 
issues which could only be resolved by the reception of 
evidence to support those claims, after full and fair 
opportunity for Brinkerhoffs to meet those contentions. 
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SETTING ASIDE THE SHERIFF'S SALE WAS ERROR BECAUSE 
RELIEF OF THAT NATURE WAS NEITHER FRAMED BY THE 
PLEADINGS NOR PRESENTED FOR ADJUDICATION 
Rule 54, URCP, provides in part that "every final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in 
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." This rule 
has broad application. When issues not framed by the 
pleadings are developed by the evidence offered in the 
context of trial, and there is no prejudice to the 
responding party, relief which is otherwise proper can be 
granted by the trial Court. Guardian State Bank v. 
Stangl, 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989); Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 
757 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1988). However, the rule is 
otherwise when the issues upon which relief is granted are 
not fairly presented to the Court for determination. 
Relief, however appropriate, may not be granted to a 
nonparty. Hiltsley v, Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987). 
A decision may not be rendered by a trial Court when not 
presented to it for determination. Neilson v. Neilson, 
780 P.2d 1264 (Utah App. 1989). Issues not urged at the 
time of trial by the presentation of appropriate evidence 
- 15 -
cannot receive the atteition »f I In* f i i i 1 < mii I Owen v 
Owen, 734 P.2d 414 (Utah 1986). An expansive discussion 
oi the impropriety of adjudicating issues not raised 
before or during trial is found in Combe v. Warren's 
Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984), wherein 
this Court stated the following: 
It is error to adjudicate issues not raised 
before or during trial and unsupported by 
the record. Curran v. Mount, Ala., 657 P.2d 
389 (1980). The trial court is not 
privileged to determine matters outside the 
issues of the case, and if he does, his 
findings will have no force or effect. 
Brantley v. Carlsbad Irr. Dist., 92 N.M. 
280, 587 FTTd 4*27 (1978) . In law or in 
equity, a judgment must be responsive to the 
issues framed by the pleadings, and a trial 
court has no authority to render a decision 
on issues not presented for determination. 
Any findings rendered outside the issues are 
a nullity. Matter of Estate of Hulbutt, 36 
Or.App. 721,585 P72d 774 (1978) ; Credit 
Investment and Loan Co. v. Guaranty Bank § 
Trust Co., 166 Colo. 471, 44 P.2d 633 
(1968). A-court may not grant judgment for 
relief which is neither requested by the 
pleadings nor within the theory on which the 
case was tried, whether that theory was 
expressly stated or implied by the proofs 
adduced. Leonard Farms v_. Carlsbad 
Riverside Terrace, 90 N.M. 34, 559 P.2d 411 
(1977). Parties may limit the scope of the 
litigation if they choose, and if an issue 
is clearly withheld, the court cannot 
nevertheless adjudicate it and grant 
corresponding relief. Wineglass Ranches, 
Inc. v. Campbell, 12 \riz.App. 571, 473 P.2d 
496 (1970); La Bellman v. Gleason $ Sanders, 
Inc. , Okl. 4l8 P72d 949 (1966). The 
limitation to try the issues presented 
obtains whether the action is one in law or 
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in equity and includes declaratory judgments 
as well. Heintz v. Sinner, 232 Or. 529, 376 
P.2d 478 (196TJT 
Farr did not seek to avoid the Sheriff's sale by 
the body or prayer of his Complaint. He did not raise 
that issue in his motion for summary judgment. Counsel 
for Farr did not discuss vacating the Sheriff's sale in 
the only affidavit filed by Farr in the case (Proffered 
Testimony of Paul D. Lyman, R.155-157). The trial Court 
suggested that the Sheriff's sale may have been infirm in 
its order of August 21, 1989, but Farr did nothing to 
raise the issue thereafter by pleading or motion. A 
request to set aside the Sheriff's sale was first made in 
argument to the Court on July 11, 1990, at which time the 
trial Court ruled thereon. No trial occurred. No evidence 
was presented. Brinkerhoffs had no opportunity to meet 
the issue belatedly raised. The nullification of the 
Sheriff's sale by the ruling of the trial Court exceeded 
the scope of the pleadings, the issues as framed by the 
competing motions for summary judgment, the affidavits 
filed in support of those motions, and precluded trial and 
a full and fair presentation of evidence. 
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POINT 11 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDED THE GRANTING 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE SHERIFFS SALE 
One sworn statement 1 suffice t<» preciu.: > the 
granting of summary judgment. Ho lbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1975), The presence of a dispute as to any 
material fact disallows summary judgment Bi 1.1 Brown 
Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977). Even 
though ttH; parties to a controversy may not be in complete 
conflict as to the material facts, where the under-
standing, intention, and consequences of those facts are 
vigorously contested, summary jud^m* nt. i •- n .»t proper. 
Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978), It is 
improper for a trial Court to weigh or resolve disputed 
evidence when a claim for summary ju^^u .-.i. is 
entertained. Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 763 
P.2d 761 (Utah 1988). Cross-motions for summary judgment 
do not ipso facto dissipate the existence of material 
issues of fact, even though the moving parties each 
contend that there exist no material issues of fact. 
Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1981). 
The net effect of the final order of the Court 
was that it did adjudicate issues of fact. The real 
damage, however, to Brinkerhoffs, is that it places them 
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at the unbridled mercy of Farr. If the ruling of the 
trial Court is allowed to stand, Farr will have the 
opportunity to execute against the same real property 
again, and thus benefit from his own mistakes- Farr 
claimed (by his counsel's argument on July 11, 1990, T.5), 
that he was confused at the time of sale because 
Brinkerhoff had just prior to that time asserted his 
homestead claim and reconveyed the real property to 
himself and Mrs. Brinkerhoff. It is hardly credible that 
Farrfs counsel could claim confusion or surprise based 
upon the assertion of a homestead claim. He interviewed 
Mr. Brinkerhoff, discussed his assets, and undoubtedly 
learned that the real property at issue in this cause was 
the only realty in which Mr. Brinkerhoff had an interest. 
A homestead claim was highly likely. UCA §78-23-4 provides 
for service of a homestead claim upon a Sheriff who is 
conducting an execution sale of the very property subject 
to the claim. 
The matter of the interest of Mrs. Brinkerhoff in 
the property was also fully within the cognizance of 
FarrTs counsel. He personally told Mr. Brinkerhoff, on 
November 23, 1988, that the interest of Mrs. Brinkerhoff 
would be extinguished if he signed the deed bearing that 
date (R.156), and that no consideration would flow to her 
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for her interest, even though that interest had a value of 
$120,000.00. The Sheriff's sale occurred five months 
later. The confusion which I jii mow claims was 
non-existent. In any event, the claim of confusion was 
never raised until stated in final oral argument, and 
would at best present an issue of fact precluding summary 
judgment. The bid which Mr. Farr made by his counsel at 
the Sheriff's sale was reasonable iml liir in light of the 
value of the property, the interest therein of Mrs.' 
Brinkerhoff, and the superior claims by First Security 
Bank and Mr. Brinkerhoff!s homestead. To allow hi i to 
set aside his own sale would fly in the face of the 
principles recently stated in Occidental/Nebraska Federal 
Savings v. Mehr, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 55 (April 19, 1990), 
wherein the Utah Court of Appeals observed that a 
foreclosure sale once made should not be vacated and set 
aside unless the interests of the debtor were sacrificed 
or the sale was attended by fraud or unfair dealing. That 
case stands for the proposition that a party should not be 
allowed to utilize his own error to invalidate a sale 
absent some compelling justification. Mehr, at 57. 
Principles of estoppel have application to avoid the 
foreclosing party from taking advantage of its own mistake 
to the detriment of the other party. Mehr, at 56. There 
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is no fraud or unfair dealing in this case, except insofar 
as Mrs. Brinkerhoff was placed at risk as to her interest 
in the property. 
Even if Farrfs claims of confusion and mistake 
first voiced by hira in final oral argument, were to be 
viewed as being properly raised in the suit, we have at 
best the existence of factual issues. In the course of a 
brief hearing, involving oral argument only, Farr injected 
new claims of confusion and mistake into the suit. The 
Court promptly found his factual assertions to be true, 
without proof or evidence, and granted his requested 
relief. That day, both justice and Brinkerhoffs were 
by-passed. 
CONCLUSION 
The ruling of the trial Court in vacating the 
Sheriff's sale reached an issue not framed by the parties 
in their pleadings and motions. The Court found that the 
Sherifffs sale should be set aside without proof or 
evidence being offered to support that result, and without 
an opportunity on the part of Brinkerhoffs to meet any 
claim by Farr that the Sheriff?s sale was a nullity. 
Consequently, the findings of the Court in that regard, 
including its final ruling, should not stand. 
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During final argument, for the first time, Farr 
contended that he bid at the Sheriff's sale by mistake, 
and that his mistake resulted from confusion on his part 
at the time of the sale. He contended that the confusion 
was caused by the last minute filing by Brinkerhoffs of a 
homestead election, and a correction deed vesting title in 
the real property to the Brinkerhoffs jointly. Whether 
Mr. Farr was laboring under a state of confusion is an 
issue of fact. Whether Farr bid at the sale by mistake is 
an issue of fact. Whether the homestead claim and the 
correction deed produced confusion on the part of Farr 
presents issues of fact. Whether Farr failed to pay his 
bid as a result of confusion and mistake presents issues 
of fact. If Farr was in fact confused at the time of the 
sale, he did not become aware of his own confusion until 
more than one year thereafter. The trial Court resolved 
issues of fact without receiving proof or evidence to 
support same, and denied Brinkerhoffs the opportunity to 
present evidence in opposition thereto. 
This Court should reverse and remand the case to 
the trial Court with instructions that the parties be 
permitted to adduce and present evidence in support of 
their respective positions, all in the context of a trial. 
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DATED this 9th day of January, 1991. 
LABRUM, TAYLOR $ BLACKWELL 
By /lUliuiTZ 
MARCUS TAYLOR 0 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I herewith and hereby certify that four copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS were placed in the 
United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class 
postage thereon fully prepaid, this 9th day of January, 
1991, addressed as follows: 
Paul D. Lyman 
Attorney at Law 
250 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
MARCUS TAYLOR /, 
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ADDENDUM 
TRIAL COURT ORDER, DATED AUGUST 21, 1989 
FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL, DATED AUGUST 15, 1990 
W IS II 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WAYNE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS FARR, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
EARL BRINKERHOFF 
and EUNICE BRINKERHOFF, 
Defendant. 
0 K I) I R 
CIVIL NO. 1218 
The Motions for Summary Judgment of the Plaintiff and 
Defendants are both denied for the following reasons: 
1. There is an issue of fact if Eunice Brinkerhoff 
has any ownership in that property allegedly sold. 
2. There is an issue if the sale was consumated. If 
so, what was sold, and if the court should allow 
same when bid price was not paid. 
Both parties are ordered to appear and show cause why 
the Court should not set aside the Sheriff's sale and why the interest 
of Eunice Brinkerhoff in the property should not be determined prior 
to execution on the foreign judgment. 
The date of hearing shall be set at the convenience of 
Court and Counsel. 
•i _ 
Dated this %{ day of August, 1989-v. 
-t 
DON V. TIBBS/ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Civil // 1218 
Wayne County 
Order August, 1989. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the day of August, 1989, I mailed a copy of 
the above and foregoing Order to the following, postage pre-paid 
from offices at Manti, Utah: 
Marcus Taylor, Attorney for Defendants 
108 North Main, Richfield, Utah, 84701 
Paul D. Lyman, Attorney for Plaintiff 
Sevier County Courthouse, Richfield, Utah, 84701 
Carole B. Mellor 
District Court Administrator 
Paul D. Lyman #4522 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
250 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 896-6812 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WAYNE COUNTY 
.
 S T A T E 0 F U T M 
THOMAS FARR, 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
EARL B. BRINKERHOFF and s 
EUNICE BRINKERHOFF, 
Defendants. * Civil.No. 1218 
This matter came before the Court on July 11, 1990f at the District 
Courtroom, Loa, Utah, before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs. The Plaintiff was 
present throi lgh counsel, Paul I) l.yuwtii, an.I tl .< Defendant:.. wnv present 
through counsel, Marcus Taylor. After both parties having previously 
submitted Motions for Summary Judgment, the parties were ordered to appear 
before the Court and uh'/w L\mr;e why Llie Court should not set aside the 
Sheriff's sale and why the interest of Eunice Brinkerhoff in the property 
should not be determined prior to execution on the foreign ji ldgment Both 
counsel were allowed to argue at length and stated that their respective 
positions were before the Court through oral argument, previous written 
argument and affidavits on file. The counsel for the Plaintiff offered to 
concede that Eunice Brinkerhoff was a joint tenant in the property, if the 
Sheriff's sale was set aside. 
The Court, based upon the undisputed portions of the parties' 
affidavits in their respective motions for summary judgment, pointed out that 
on March 6, 1989, an execution sale of the Defendants' real property in Wayne 
/ 
Page 2—Order of Dismissal 
Thomas Farr vs. Earl B. Brinkerhoff, et al 
County was scheduled and conducted; that immediately prior to said sale, the 
Defendant, Earl B. Brinkerhoff, caused a "Warranty Deed (Correction)" along 
with a "Declaration of Homestead" to be filed with the Wayne County Recorder; 
that said correction deed purported to change the record ownership of said 
real property from just Earl B. Brinkerhoff to Earl B. Brinkerhoff and Eunice 
Brinkerhoff, as joint tenants; and that an amount was bid at the sale, which 
the Defendants claim was more than the debt, but no money was collected. 
The March 6, 1989, sale was not consummated because it is not clear 
what was being purchased and the bid price was not paid, and in light of this 
Court's ruling and the Plaintiff's offer to concede on the issue of Eunice 
Brinkerhoff being a joint tenant with Earl B. Brinkerhoff, there are no more 
issues to be tried. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
The Court then issued the following Order of Dismissal. 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. The March 6, 1989, Sheriff's sale is set aside. 
2. Eunice Brinkerhoff is a joint tenant with Earl B. Brinkerhoff in 
the following described real property in Wayne County, Utah: 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of the Southwest 
quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 36, Township 
28 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian and running 
thence South 200 feet; thence West 200 feet; thence North 
200 feet; thence East 200 feet to point of beginning. 
3. This declaratory relief action is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this day of August, 1990. 
DON V. TIBBS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
//// //. ^ 4 %$.<*-
MARCUS TAYLOR 
Attorney for Defeil 
